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London North Western
Railway:
Midland
Railway:
Stratford
Midland Junction Railway
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Railway Accident on the Leamington to Kenilworth Line at
Leek Wootton
On this page:
An overview
The accident at the cross roads near Leek Wootton, which
occurred on 11th June 1861, was caused by bridge failure. Robin Leach's book,
'Kenilworth's Railway Age',
describes both the circumstances leading up to the accident and the coroners
report afterwards. The bridge's frailty could not have been a surprise to the
LNWR's management because it was known to vibrate more than others on the line
and had become something of a local attraction due to its swaying movement and
loud rumbling noise as trains passed over it; it had even been given the name
'Crackley' by local youngsters. Within less than ten years of the bridge being
erected in 1844, a major repair had been made in 1853.
The inevitable accident occurred when LNWR Southern
Division 0-6-0 No 282, running tender first with a train of empty mineral
wagons to Victoria Colliery - later the site of the power station at Longford,
passed over the bridge at a speed of between 7 mph to 8 mph up the long incline
to Kenilworth. With the full weight of the locomotive (some 30 tons) on it the
bridge collapsed, the tender, having just reached the far side, jackknifed as
it fell, crushing the crew in the cab. The crew comprised the driver, George
Rowley of Brockhall, near Weedon, and the fireman, John Wade of Preston. Both
young men were due to be married within two weeks of the accident. The space
between the two abutments, about 50 feet, was filled with debris from both the
bridge and the train. It took several hours to extract the crew's bodies which
were then taken to the nearby Anchor Public House.
Whilst the initial cause was identified as being the
failure of one of the transverse cast-iron beams, the coroner's court and the
Board of Trade's inspector identified three fundamental reasons for the
accident:
a) the bridge when first built had been expected to carry much
lighter loads, the Bury type locomotives employed weighed approximately 10
tons
b) the design of the bridge was considered to be poor and not fit for
purpose combined with poor cast-iron manufacturing techniques, and
c) the
subsequence maintenance and repairs to the bridge were very poor when compared
to contemporary railway practice and not just once but on a number of
occasions.
Robert Stephenson was the principal engineer and had
sketched out the line but a Thomas Wodhouse had been the first engineer of the
line. Robert Stephenson's prowess as a bridge builder was acknowledged
throughout the country and his bridges across the Menai Straits, Newcastle and
Berwick were considered major engineering achievements. However his design at
Leek Wootton was to prove not very adequate, albeit this was compounded by poor
subsequence maintenance and increased engine weight. There was much criticism
of Robert Stephenson's design by several witnesses, with the Chief Civil
Engineer of the L&NWR, William Baker making the comment that 'a ten pound
note would have put in a new beam'. Its worth however noting that when the line
was built, the railway's finances were very parlous with cost savings being
sought at every opportunity. A third party might have asked the L&NWR's
Engineer if it was so cheap to replace the beam why wasn't it bearing in mind
the time and money spent on patching it.
The coroner's court, under the direction of WJ Poole, and
the Board of Trade's representative from the railway inspectorate, Captain
Tyler previously of the Royal Engineers, heard evidence which clearly showed
that whilst other factors contributed to the accident the principal reason was
the failure by the L&NWR of not carrying out the necessary remedial work
when the problem had been first identified some four years earlier; namely to
replace rather than repair the cast-iron transverse beams.
The accident did have other repercussions namely it allowed
internal L&NWR politics to be played out. The L&NWR was at the time of
the accident divided into different operating divisions. Initially the
L&NWR had three divisions which were based upon the three original railway
companies which formed the L&NWR in 1846. In 1857 the three divisions
became two divisions: the North Division based at Crewe and the Southern
Division based at Wolverton. John Ramsbottom was Northern Division
Superintendent who began to standardise and modernise the locomotive stock,
initially replacing the 2-4-0 goods engines with his 'DX' 0-6-0 locomotives, of
which over 900 were built at Crewe from 1858 to 1872.
The first Southern Division Locomotive Superintendent was
Edward Bury who had been in charge of the London and Birmingham Railway
locomotive department at Wolverton since before that railway opened. He
resigned in 1847 and later became General Manager of the Great Northern
Railway. His successor at Wolverton was James McConnell who had previously
worked for the Birmingham and Gloucester Railway at their Bromsgrove works.
Among the classes built under his superintendence were the very successful
2-2-2 "Bloomers", developed from a Bury design, and the Wolverton Express Goods
0-6-0 class, built from 1854 to 1863. The Southern Division's trains were
longer and heavier, and 0-6-0 locos had been introduced as early as 1845. It
was one of McConnell's locomotives which was involved in the accident.
There were distinct differences between the Southern and
Northern Division locomotive policies. Wolverton had been set up in 1838 for
repair work only, the locomotives being purchased from outside firms, whereas
Crewe, from its foundation in 1843, was a locomotive-building works. Only a
dozen locomotives were built at Wolverton from 1845 to the end of 1854, but in
the following year construction started in earnest, and another 154 were
completed in 1855-1863. The Southern Division engines were bigger, heavier and
more expensive than those of the Northern Division, and after a disagreement
with the cost-conscious Chairman, Richard Moon, in 1862 McConnell was obliged
to resign. The accident at Leek Wootton was used as part of Richard Moon's
evidence against McConnell. The Southern and Northern locomotive departments
were consequently amalgamated, and John Ramsbottom became Locomotive
Superintendent of the entire LNWR, his headquarters remaining at Crewe.
Locomotive building and repairing were gradually run down at Wolverton, which
became the LNWR's carriage works in 1865.
We have transcribed below the original accident report
submitted by Captain Tyler, RE and an article from the LNWR Society's Journal
written by Harry Jack and discussing the accident with a potted history of the
locomotive.
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Photographs and Drawings
View of accident from Coventry Road looking towards
Warwick
View of accident from Coventry Road looking towards
Ashow
Sketches used by Captain Tyler to illustrate his Board
of Trade report
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The Board of Trade Accident Report
Railway Department,
Board of Trade,
Whitehall,
9th
August 1861
Sir,
I am directed by the Lords of the Committee of Privy
Council for Trade to transmit to you to be laid before the Directors of the
London and North-Western Railway Company, the enclosed copy of the report made
by Captain Tyler, R.E., the officer appointed by their Lordships to inquire
into the circumstances connected with the accident which occurred on 11th June
from a goods train breaking through a bridge near Wootton.
I am, &c,
E.A. Bowring
............................................................................................................................................................................
The Secretary of the London and North-Western Railway
Company
Sir
In compliance with the instructions contained in your
minute of the 12th June last, I have now the honour to report, for the
information of the Lords of the Committee of Privy Council for Trade, the
result of my inquiry into the circumstances which attended the accident, that
occurred on the 11th of that month, in consequence of the failure of a bridge
on the London North-Western Railway between Leamington and Kenilworth.
The 6am mineral train from Kenilworth to Leamington passed
over the line in due course on the morning of 11th June 1861, and started empty
on its return journey from Leamington at about 7 o'clock, with a six-wheel
coupled good engine (such as was usually employed) attached to it, which
weighed about 30 tons, independent of the tender. It was travelling at a speed
of seven or eight miles per hour, when a bridge at Wootton, half way to
Kenilworth, suddenly failed under the weight of this engine.
The bridge was constructed in the year of 1844, to carry the
railway over two roads, namely, that of the Stoneleigh to Guys Cliff, and that
from Leek Wootton to Hill Wootton; and it covered a span of 50 feet. The main
girders, consisting of two timber trusses, were connected together below by
five cast-iron transverse girders (See section No 1), and these latter were
suspended at their ends on wrought iron bolts attached to the trusses. The
rails were carried on longitudinal sleepers, resting on planking which were
supported by them.
In the year 1853, the trusses of the main girders were
strengthened, some of the timbers were renewed, new rails were placed upon the
bridge, and one of the cast iron cross-girders was patched, to cover a defect
which appeared, below the flange, and near the middle of it, at the point where
the strains upon it in tension were the greatest.
It was spliced, as shown in section No 2 with two angle
irons, each 3½ x 3½ x ½", by 3 feet long, and two packing
strips, 1" x 2½" by the same length, and was pierced by bolt holes
(shown in black in the section), on each side of the flange, and below it;
those through the web having been six in number.
The debris of the bridge and the train were left
undisturbed, at the request of Mr W Savage Poole, the coroner for Kenilworth,
until I visited the scene of the accident the day after it occurred. The main
girders were then standing nearly in their places. The cast-iron cross-girders
had all broken transversely, at various distances from their centres, and were
hanging by their ends from the main trusses, the wrought iron bolts by which
they were connected with the upper portion, and attached to the lower portion
of the trusses, having in no case given way. The engine, which had been
travelling tender first, stood upright upon its wheels in the road nearly in
the middle between the trusses, and against the abutment nearer to Kenilworth;
while the tender, which had evidently passed off the bridge before the engine
fell, was dragged back upon it, and rested on it in an upright position, with
its wheels against the face of the abutment.
The six wagons next behind the engine fell in upon it, and
lay in a confused mass, with a seventh upon them, filling up the chasm formed
between the trusses.
The driver and fireman had unfortunately been crushed to
death by the tender, as it fell back upon the engine; but the guard, who was
riding in a breakvan (sic) at the tail of the train, and a porter who was with
him, do not appear to have been injured: as the remaining wagons of the train,
and the van, were brought to a stand against those which fell into the road,
without very great violence, when no room was left on the road for more.
Of the five cast-iron girders which had thus failed, and
whose failure was obviously the cause of the accident, three exhibited flaws in
the sections of fracture. The first, commencing from the Leamington abutment,
had a blow-hole in it ¾" x ½", close to the lower end, which had
not been visible from the exterior. The third had two similar defects in it,
one near the bottom ¾" deep by 1¼" wide, and the other in the
fillet 1½" x 3/8". The second showed decided symptoms of a previous
crack, which had extended, not only below one of the bolt-holes (indicated in
the above section No 2) in the middle web, but also for some little distance
above this bolt-hole; and it had evidently been by far the weakest of the
girders for some time before the accident. The sides of this crack could not
have been seen from the exterior because they were covered by the splicing
angle-irons. The bottom of it might have been observed to open during the
passage of a train over it; but it was not unlikely to escape observation,
which it appears to have done. There can be no reasonable doubt that this
second girder was the first to give way under the weight of the goods engine.
It must have been previously in a critical condition: and after having been
cracked in the manner that I have described it was not extraordinary that the
complete fracture should at length take place.
These cross-girders were placed at distances of 8'-4" apart,
from centre to centre; and, when the second girder gave way, the additional
strain thrown suddenly on the first and third caused them, apparently, to give
way also. The fourth and fifth, then, in consequence of the forward motion of
the engine, being subjected successively to the greater portion of its weight,
must have failed in like manner, until the engine fell, not far from the end of
the bridge, into the position in which it was found in the road below.
The breaking weight of these cast-iron transverse girders,
when sound, may be estimated to have been about 40 tons in the centre, or 80
tons equally distributed over their length; and the greatest strain produced
upon them by the passing of the engine in question, in addition to the
stationary load, to have been equal to a weight in the centre of each of about
11 tons, so the factor of safety when the girders were sound would have been
between 3 and 4, instead of 6 as is desirable in the case of all cast-iron
girders employed in railway bridges.
But the second girder above referred to, was weakened most
materially, when it was patched in 1853, by the holes (at the end of the
splices) that were made in its flange, and through the lower portion of its
middle web; and it was afterwards still further reduced in strength by the
crack, connected with the bolt-hole next to the west end of the splices, which
was the immediate cause of its failure.
These girders were of a defective form, inasmuch as the
flange should have been at the bottom of them, instead of at 4½" from
it; but they were constructed at a time when these matters were not so well
understood as at present. They were of ample strength for the engines then in
use, but they did not afford a sufficient margin of strength for the much
heavier engines of the present day. The application of the splice upon the
second of them in 1853, was an improper proceeding, as it as likely to lead to
its ultimate failure, by weakening it at the bolt-holes near each end of the
splice, and by the extra stiffness produced in the part spliced, which would
tend to bring increased strains upon the portions near to those at each end of
it which were thus weakened.
Instead of splicing that defective girder at that time, it
would have been better to have taken out all the five girders, and to have
substituted in their places new transverse girders of a better description and
more suitable material.
That they should have been allowed to remain, and that this
girder should have been so patched, and retained until failure occurred, is too
much in accordance with ordinary railway practice, which does not take
sufficient account of the increased weight, of the engines of the present day.
These engines are permitted daily to run in too many instances over bridges
which were never intended to carry more than half their weight; and sufficient
attention is not as a general rule paid, upon lines which have been opened for
a number of years, to the necessity of strengthening the bridges in proportion
to this increased weight of the engines employed, so as to ensure the margin of
strength that is desirable to interpose between a reasonable degree of safety
and actual failure.
I have &c,
H. W. Tyler,
Capt. R.E.
........................................................................................................................................................................
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LNWR Society Article
By Harry Jack
The two photographs on page 30 of Journal Vol 6 No 2 show
the remains of the bridge over Leek Wootton crossroads, about two miles south
of Kenilworth. It collapsed on the morning of 11th June 1861 as a 0-6-0 goods
engine weighing about 33 tons was passing over, breaking a faulty cast-iron
cross girder. This first beam that failed is the second from the left in the
upper photograph, hanging down above the engine's splasher. The engine was
running tender first, hauling a train of empty coal wagons for the Victoria
Colliery at Hawkesbury, some five miles north of Coventry. Leaving Leamington
at 6.50am and travelling at about 8mph, the train reached Leek Wootton and the
tender had just crossed the bridge when the engine simply dropped sixteen feet
to the road beneath, pulling the tender down with it. The footplatemen were
trapped under tons of falling coal and pinned against the firebox, where they
were burned to death. The engine was LNWR (Southern Division) No 282, one of a
class of thirty built by William Fairbairn & Sons of Manchester from 1851
to 1855.
The design, by Locomotive Superintendent James Edward
McConnell, was based closely on Beyer's 'Sphynx' type, but with his own added
peculiarities. In the case of No 282, delivered in November 1854, these
variations included a complex firebox containing three parallel water-filled
partitions, which proved very difficult to construct and maintain, and maybe
did little to assist combustion, but certainly increased the weight of an
already heavy engine. This accident focused attention, once again, on the
weight of Southern Division engines. The size and weight of McConnell's engines
had often been complained about, but at Board level he had always had the
unwavering support of Admiral Moorsom, latterly Chairman of the LNWR. Then,
just a fortnight before the accident, Moorsom suddenly died; his successor was
Richard Moon, whose attitude was rather different. McConnell's days on the
railway were numbered. Three weeks after Leek Wootton the boiler of a 7ft
Bloomer exploded on the Irish Mail; then the first of his new H-class, Special
Large Bloomer No 375, was found to be heavier than specified. Meanwhile Richard
Moon was rigorously investigating McConnell's estimates and producing damning
reports. The year 1861 was not a good one for McConnell and in the following
February he handed in his resignation.
The Leek Wootton photographs are probably those described
as having been shown to the LNWR Permanent Way Committee. They are the
earliest-known photographs showing any of this class of engine, but a similar
Fairbairn was photographed two years earlier, in like circumstances, having had
a bridge collapse under it at Bescot. The engine was Cannock of the South
Staffordshire Railway, built in 1858 and later to become LNWR (S Div) No 311.
Again, much of the detail is obscured, this time because the engine was
half-submerged in a pond. All later photographs show the engines after
rebuilding with Crewe boilers in the 1860s. In the Leek Wootton pictures
McConnell's brass corniced dome and safety valve trumpet can be partly seen.
The chimney seems to have been broken off and buried by the falling wagons, but
the extra lock-up safety valve is clearly visible in silhouette in both
photographs. Details of the engine's livery are unclear: it was probably green
with black bands. No engine number is apparent on either the footplate fender
or the boiler side, but it would have been in cast numerals on the segmental
brass plate, unreadable here, but visible as a light patch on the coupling-rod
arch of the middle splasher. Apart from the missing chimney and a broken buffer
plank, the engine doesn't look in bad shape, despite its fall. It survived,
latterly as No 1981, until November 1879. The two uniformed and top-hatted men
look like police officers guarding the accident site; the other four men may
have been members of the rescue party or railway officials.
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