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London North Western
Railway:
Midland
Railway:
Stratford
Midland Junction Railway
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Birdingbury Station
Birdingbury Station, opened on 1st March 1851 to both
passenger and goods traffic, was with Marton one of the two intermediate
stations on the original single line route from Rugby to Leamington. The access
to the station was from Bourton Lane located on the up line with the up
platform accommodating the original station building which was home to the
booking office, waiting room, toilets and the station masters house. The
station building was of plain but substantial brick-built design. Like many
19th century stations its passenger facilities were contained within the
building, there being no canopy projecting outwards on to the platform to
provide shelter in inclement weather. When the line was doubled a new platform
was erected to handle down trains and erected on it was a small timber waiting
room with an short canopy which at best offered just a little protection to
passengers opening or closing the door in poor weather. Vic Mitchell and Keith
Smith evidence in their book Midland Main Lines -
Rugby to Birmingham (which included the lines to Leaminton, Weedon
and Milverton) that passenger services to Leamington Spa were light when the
line first opened, there being only five trains on weekdays in 1851 with no
Sunday service at all. This figure increased to seven by 1871 and in the lead
up to the time the line was doubled there were also one or two on Sundays until
1883. The 1895 timetable showed eight trains through to Warwick Milverton, two
of which omitted four stops at intermediate stations. There were still eight
trains operating in 1921, but now calling at all stations. Wartime economy
measures meant only six trains per day were scheduled on the line in 1945 but
with the decline in passenger numbers due to competition by buses, this had
dropped to five by the time services were withdrawn on 15th June 1959.
The goods yard was accessed from the same lane with a
driveway that also led to a private level crossing immediately adjacent to the
Rugby end of the platforms. This remained in existence until 1893 when it was
removed. The driveway was also private property although according to R Preston
Hendry and R Powell Hendry in their book 'LMS Stations
- Volume One' a right of way was granted to the LNWR and their
clients to access the goods yard. This was available to all vehicles 'except
those propelled by steam'. The station's down platform was opened on 28th
January 1884 at the same as the line was doubled between Rugby and Marton. The
signal box was located opposite the goods yard on the Rugby side of the down
(Leamington) line. This became redundant with the closure of the goods and
removal of goods facilities in 1953. Unusually, on each platform was a small
lever frame which could be used when the signal box was closed. The Goods Yard
was located on the same side of the line as the main station buildings. This
became the up line when the line was doubled. In essence, the yard was a
passing loop with a head shunt at each end off which came a single siding
running at approximately 20º to the running line.
The Goods Yard had a public weighbridge and Office from a
very early date (its recorded on the 1884 Ordnance
Survey Map - see the pink oblong shape adjacent to the 'white' oblong shape
in the yard). The Railway Clearing House's 1929
Handbook of Railway Stations records Dunchurch station providing a
nearly full range of services: Goods traffic; Passenger and Parcels traffic;
Livestock; Horse Boxes and Prize Cattle Vans; and Carriages (Horse-drawn - Ed)
by Passenger Trains, the only exception being Furniture Vans (This is recorded
in the book as 'GPLHC'). The 1894 edition of Handbook
of Railway Stations was not as detailed in recording the services on
offer, however this not an issue as only Goods and Passenger facilities were
available. No Goods Shed existed at Birdingbury which probably accounts for why
no crane was recorded on site (most goods sheds were fitted with a small
hand-operated crane). Should a merchant require a crane then he would have to
hire a rail mounted crane of the type seen in image 'lnwrcs2124'. Unusually, the goods yard closed before
passenger services with goods traffic ceasing on 3rd August 1953 the sidings
being lifted shortly after closure. The line from Rugby to Southam via Marton
Junction remained open for cement works traffic for some time.
Trains seen at or near Birdingbury Station
Ordnance Survey Maps
Timetables
Accident at Birdingbury Station on 1st January 1856
The following report, dated 18th January 1856, was
commissioned by the Secretary of the Railway Department of the Board of Trade.
The report, together with many others, can be found at
www.railwaysarchive.co.uk, the Railway Archive website.
Because the line from Rugby to Leamington was in 1856
single track throughout and operated under the single staff or stick system
which allows the station master of either end to send forward trains whilst the
staff is in his possession. When the last train to be forwarded has been sent
before another from the opposite direction is due the station master hands the
staff to the guard to hand to the station master at the other end of the line.
The line then becomes locked from the end at the end from where the staff has
been sent. The 1:30pm passenger train from Rugby to Leamington was dispatched
15 minutes after time; it was more than ordinarily heavy, consisting of four
carriages, four carriage trucks, and two vans; the usual train is not more than
half of this size. The time allowed in going to Birdingbury, the first station
on the line, is nine minutes, the distance being something more than six miles,
but the guard stated that it was never done with an ordinary train in less than
twelve or fourteen minutes. Leaving Rugby there is an ascending gradient for
two miles of 1 in 127, and when that is surmounted the line falls rapidly;
Birdingbury station being at the foot of an incline nearly two miles in length
which falls 1 in 112, and, as the line curves rapidly a short distance from the
station, the latter does not become visible until it is approached within 600
yards; it is protected only by a station signal.
The passenger train reached Birdingbury at 2:00pm, having
lost six minutes on the way; it was delayed three minutes at the station, and
was slowly moving away, having proceeded only forty or fifty yards, when it was
run into by a coal train from Rugby. This train was dispatched at 1:55pm; it
consisted of thirteen loaded wagons and a break (sic) van, and its weight might
be 135 tons; it was drawn by a passenger engine; the coals were to be delivered
to Manton (sic) Station, the succeeding one to Birdingbury; the driver who was
selected to take this train had never before been on the line. and the fireman
stated that he had only been on the line twice before, once at night and that
six months had elapsed since he had been over the line. The driver stated that
in going around the curve, which hides the view of the station, he was not
going more than seventeen or eighteen miles an hour; that then having asked the
fireman what distance were they from the station, he replied it was just
through the bridge and that he then immediately reversed and screwed on the
break (sic) himself. The fireman says that they were going forty miles an hour,
and that when the driver asked him how far they were from the station, he
replied he did not know, but that he thought they were not far off; immediately
after, they came in sight of it, the station, as I mentioned before, not being
visible more than 600 yards off. The speed must have undoubtedly been much
greater than what the driver states, as the collision was a severe one, the
coal being thrown down the bank on one side, and a great number of wagons
thrown off the line on the other side, and the van and some of the trucks of
the passenger train smashed to pieces.
From the circumstances I have just detailed there will be
little difficulty in assigning the collision to the proper causes, and in
indicating the departments to which blame attaches.
The collision it is evident was caused by sending the driver
on a line with which he was totally unacquainted, accompanied by a fireman
hardly better informed in the matter, that line presenting features of
difficulty in its gradients, curves, and in the position of at least one of its
stations, that station being situated immediately at the bottom of a long
incline of 1 in 112, and not visible more than 600 yards off, an unprotected by
a distance signal which would point to the necessity that the driver selected
to conduct a train over it should be well acquainted with its peculiarities,
and the circumstances of a station, the position of which had nothing to
indicate its nearness to a stranger. The driver said, and no doubt said truly,
"If there had been a distance signal to indicate my nearness to the station I
should not have run into the train."
The departments to blame are, the locomotive, which sent a
driver off over a difficult line, with the peculiarities of which he was
perfectly ignorant; and the department in which the responsibility of erecting
proper signals at the station.
I was informed by the Superintendent of the southern
division of the line that the Directors had inquired into the circumstances
connected with this collision, and had punished the man who had dispatched the
coal train, not because he disobeyed any order in sending it off within an
interval of not more than eight minutes between trains, - for, by recent
instructions which have been issued, it appears that three or
more trains are now allowed to travel at the same time between stations
not three miles apart, which would involve intervals of time infinitely
shorter, and which one is almost afraid to contemplate, - but because they
considered he should have exercised a discretionary power, and allowed an
interval of twenty minutes or more, the dispatch of the coal train not being a
matter of urgency. Now, as it is a rule on every line in the kingdom that
trains may follow at an interval of five minutes, it appears a very unjust
measure to visit with punishment a man guilty only of error of judgement, if
error it was, and to allow the real culpable parties to escape. Had the
Directors been aware of all the circumstances of the case they could hardly
have come to the decision they have done, and I am therefore glad to have this
opportunity of making all the facts of the case known to them.
When single lines are worked, as ordinarily is the case,
with one engine, the necessity for auxiliary signals is not so apparent, but
with the system adopted by the LNWR on their single lines it is obvious that
trains require to be protected by signals in the same manner as on double
lines, and I know of no instance in which an auxiliary signal is more required
than at Birdingbury Station, and that the Directors in their investigation
should have overlooked a question of such urgency would argue a very
superficial investigation in to the subject.
George Wynne, Lieutenant Colonel, Royal Engineers
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